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RALPH H. GROVES, Hespondent, v. CITY OF l.JOS
ANGELES et al., Appellants.
[1] Licenses- Exemptions- Insurance Companies and Agents.A city ordinance imposing a license tax on a person engaged in
the business of soliciting, effecting and negotiating undertakings of bail as agent of an insurance company violates
Const., art. XIII, § 14 4/5, declaring that state tax on insurance
companies based on income from business done within state
is in lieu of all other taxes and licenses on such insurers and
their property.
[2a, 2b] Brokers-Bail Bond Brokers-Licensed Agents.--In view
of the statutory provision that an insurer cannot conduct a
bail bond business except by and through a licensed bail agent
(Ins. Code, § 1800), it will be presumed that the insurer obeyed
the law (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subds. 1, 33), and therefore
is doing its business through a licensed agent.
[3) Id.-Bail Bond Brokers-Licensed Agents.-The holding of a
bail agent's license, which must have the approval of the insurer, is evidence of agency.
[ 4] Id.-Bail Bond Brokers-Licensed Agents.-Requirements of
Insurance Code that bail bond agents must meet special qualifications and obtain a license, and contracts between an insurance company and its general agent which refer to "sale"
of bonds by former to latter for "resale" to bail agents, and
similarly those between general agent and a bail agent which
refer to "sale" by former to latter for "resale" by him to the
public, as well as requirement that bail agent must indemnify
general agent rather than insurer for losses, while factors to be
considered are not so compelling as to refute wholly the basic
circumstances that insurer may only conduct a bail bond business through agents, and does not support claim that bail agent
is conducting an independent business.
[5] Id.-Bail Bond Brokers-Agency for Insurer.-A bail agent is
not an independent contractor merely because, pursuant to
agreement with the insurer or its general agent, rebates on
premiums are given or commissions split by them, since it is
plain from Ins. Code, § 1809, that in all matters in respect
[1] See Cal.Jur., Licenses, § 38.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Bail and Recognizance, § 47 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Bail and Recognizance (Rev. ed.), § 10.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Licenses, § 38; [2-9] Brokers, § 187;
[10] Statutes,§ 180(2).
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thereto the surety on the bail bond is the principal and all
licensees connected with the transaction are the surety's agents.
[6] Id.-Bail Bond Brokers-Agency for Insurer.-The fact that
bail agents are subject to regulation and must meet certain
qualifications does not deprive them of the character of agents
for the insurer.
[7] Id.-Bail Bond Brokers-Agency for Insurer.--1\IIere fact that
bail agent, having agreed to pay insurer specified percentage
of face amount of each bond sold, may charge for the bond
such percentage as he desires not exceeding 10 per cent, does
not necessarily establish him as an independent contractor
rather than as the insurer's agent.
[8] Id.-Bail Bond Brokers-Premium for Bond.-The full sum
received by a bail agent from one desiring a bail bond is
the gross premium for the bond, and as he does so as agent for
the insurer it is immaterial how the insurer, its general agent
and the bail agent choose to allocate the allowance, or that the
bail agent does not pay all of the 10 per cent of the face of
the bond, which he charges his customer or client, to the insurer or its general agent; the insurer can only act througli
agents, and as wliat tlie agent receives in legal effect tlie insurer receives, a mere bookkeeping metliod cannot thwart tlie
law.
[9] Id. -Bail Bond Brokers- Premium for Bond.-Wliere bail
agent, pursuant to agreement with insurer, may cliarge for
eacli bond sold sucli percentage as lie desires not exceeding
10 per cent of tlie face amount tliereof, and books of tlie
insurer show tliat it lias received 1 per cent of sucli amount,
sucli 1 per cent may not be construed as the only premium;
tlie 9 per cent retained by the agent would also constitute
premium.
[10] Statutes-Construction-Departmental Construction.-An administrative construction wliich is erroneous is not binding on
a court.

APPEATJ from a judgment of the Superior Court of h1s
Angeles County. John Gee Clark, Judge. Affirmed.
Action to enjoin a city from collecting a license tax. ,J udgment for plaintiff affirmed.
l~ay h Chesebro, City Attorney, John L. 1Nynn, Assistant
City Attorney, and W. h "Weber, Deputy City Attorney, for

Appellants.
[10] See Cal.Jur., Statutes, § 152; Am.Jur., Statutes, § 319.
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IJatham & Watkins and Keene ·watkins as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Appellants.
0. Revelle Harrison and Thomas B. Sawyer for Respondent.

J;Jdmuncl G. Brown, .Attorney General, and Harold B. Haas,
Deputy Attorney General as Amici Curiae on behalf of ReRpondent.
CAR'l'ER, J .-Defendants, the City of Los Angeles, and
its chief of police and city clerk (who is its tax collector)
appeal from a judgment declaring invalid its Ordinance No.
77,000 as amended by Ordinance No. 92,414, and enjoining
the collection of the license tax thereunder. The court found
that plaintiff is engaged in the business of soliciting, effecting and negotiating undertakings of bail in and out of Los
Angeles as agent of National Automobile and Casualty Insurance Company, a corporation, (hereafter called National)
authorized to engage and engaged in the insurance business
(including bail bonds) in California; he holds a bail agent's
lieense issued under the law of this state. (Ins. Code, § 1800
et seq.)
Ordinance No. 77,000 as amended by Ordinance No. 92,414
provides that every person in the business of " ' . . . soliciting,
neg·otiating, effecting, issuing, delivering, or furnishing bail
bonds or of the posting of undertakings of bail for the release
of persons charged with public offenses shall pay for each
calendar year, or fractional part thereof, a license tax in
the sum of $50.00 for the first $5,000 or less of gross receipts,
and in addition thereto, the sum of $5.00 per year for each
additional $1,000 of gross receipts, or fractional part thereof,
in excess of $5,000. The term "gross receipts" as used herein
shall not include any insurance premiums received on behalf
of any insurance company qualified to do business in the State
of California, nor any commissions paid out of such premiums.' '' Also thereunder it is unlawful for any person to
engag·e in the specified business without a license and any
person violating the ordinance is subject to punishment.
'rhe license tax is, however, for purposes of revenue, not
regulation. (See Fox Etc. Corp. v. City of Bakersfield, 36 Cal.
2d 136 [222 P.2d 879].]
ft was also found that plaintiff is not eng·aged in the business
of posting bail bonds from which he receives gross receipts
as defined in the ordinance other than in the transaction
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of insurance business as defined by the Insurance Code.
[1] Hence the ordinance violates the Constitution which
provides that every insurance company (the term ''company" includes persons) doing business in the state shall
pay to the state a tax consisting of a fixed per cent upon the
amount of the ''gross premiums'' received upon its business
done in this state, and "The tax imposed on insurers by this
section is in lieu of all other taxes and licenses, State, county,
and municipal, upon such insurers and their property" with
exceptions not here pertinent. (Cal. Const., art. XIII,
§ 14 4/5.)
By its judgment the court declared the ordinance invalid
insofar as it purports to impose a tax on plaintiff and that
he is not liable for a tax thereunder; defendants are enjoined
from collecting any taxes levied on plaintiff by virtue of the
ordinance.
According to the evidence plaintiff's business arrangement,
generally, was as follows: Groves (not the plaintiff) and
Rubin, a partnership doing business as Associated Bond &
Insurance Agency (referred to as Associated) is in the surety
bail bond business as general agent for National and the
partners hold bail agents' licenses. Associated holds general
power of attorney from National and power to appoint agents
for it over whom it exercises close supervision. It appointed
plaintiff as one of such agents for National. Upon receiving
an application for a bail bond upon a form furnished by and
addressed to National, plaintiff would send it to Associated.
It is executed by Associated under its power of attorney from
National and delivered to plaintiff-National's agent. The
agent reported to Associated every week on business transacted, and the latter reported weekly to National. Agents,
such as plaintiff, could charge for a bail bond, any percentage
of the face amount not exceeding 10 per cent. They paid
2 per cent of the face amount of the bond (part of which was
for a reserve fund to meet losses on bonds) less a certain per
cent to Associated and the latter paid 1 per cent of the
amount of the bond, less its commission to National. National
is the surety or ''insurer'' on the bond and the one to whom
the state looks in case of forfeiture. As between the agent and
Associated the former had to make good a loss from forfeiture,
and Associated was in the same position as National in that
respect.
This case has been on appeal before (Groves v. City of Los
Angeles, 93 Cal.App.2d 17 [208 P.2d 254] ). There plaintiff
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appealed from a judgment of dismissal after defendants'
demurrer was sustained without leave to amend. The judgment was reversed. Based upon the plaintiff's allegations that
he vvas issuing bail bonds as agent of National and that the
latter has paid all the in lieu taxes under section 14 4/5 of
article XIII of the Constitution, s1tpra, the court held the
judgment erroneous, reasoning that no insurer could execute
a bail bond except through a person holding a bail license
(Ins. Code, § 1800) and that plaintiff alleged he was the agent
for National and no more. Hence there was no basis
for any assumption that plaintiff was engaged in an independent business or that the revenue from his business was
derived from such independent activity within the meaning of
the last sentence of the ordinanee, supra, which excludes from
its provisions, insurance premiums received on behalf of an
insnranee company qualified to do business in this state.
Defendants eontend that plaintiff is an independent contractor rather than an agent for National and that hence
rwither he nor National through him is engaged in the insurance business in the state and thus the in lieu tax provisions
of the Constitution, supra, do not apply, that the ordinance
does not purport to tax an insurance business (exempted
under last section, .mpra) and that therefore the judgment
enjoining the collection of the tax is erroneous.
The law on the subject was settled in Hughes v. Los
Angeles, 168 Cal. 764 [145 P. 94]. When the Hughes case
was decided the Constitution (Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 14 (b) )
provided substantially the same as now for a state tax on the
gross premiums of insurance companies vvhich was "in lieu of
all other taxes or licenses, state, county and municipal upon
the property of such companies . . . '' A Los Angeles revenue
ordinance imposed a tax of $10 per quarter on every person
or corporation carrying on the business of local or general
insurance agent, solicitor or broker. The court held the ordinance violated the Constitution, stating: ''Under the authority
of Los Angeles Tntst Co. v. City of Los Angeles, (L. A. No.
3271), ante, p. 762 [145 P. 94], this day decided, no doubt
can be entertained but that if this privilege tax were imposed
upon the insurance companies themselves it would be invalid.
The distinction sought to be drawn in this case is that this
particular license fee is not imposed upon the companies but
upon the agents of the companies. This is true, but upon the
other hand it is equally true that every insurance corporation
must act through agents and can act only through agents, and
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that, therefore, in a direet and immediate sense a tax upon
sneh agents for the right to do business is a tax upon the
('Orporation 's right to do business. The agents of corporatiom; are the means whereby the corporations live and in opposition to a tax upon their agents the corporations may
well be heard to voice Shylock's expostulation:
" 'You take my house when you do take the prop
'rhat doth sustain my house; you take my life
~When you do take the means whereby I live.' "
(HtLghes v. Los Angeles, supra, 168 Cal. 764.)
In 1937, the Legislature adopted a statute providing that
''An insurer shall not execute an undertaking of bail except
by and through a person holding a bail license issued as provided in this chapter." (Ins. Code, § 1800.)
It was held in Edu;ard Brown &: Sons v. McColgan, 53
Cal.App.2d 504 [128 P.2d 186], that the in lieu tax provision of the Constitution (Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 14 4/5,
supra) for insurance eompanies did not exempt a corporation,
which was an agent representing and selling policies for some
18 insurance companies, from the state corporation franchise
tax applicable generally to corporations. In view of the
holding of this eourt in the Hughes case, supra, 168 Cal.
764, the soundness of the last eited case may be questionable.
However, it may be distinguished on the ground that, although
the franchise tax is computed on the net income of the corporation, it is on the privilege of using the corporate mechanism to do business and hence has no relation to the nature of
the business conducted. Thus the tax is not on the insurance
business within the meaning of the Constitution.
Defendants argue, however, that here the plaintiff was an
independent contractor rather than an agent of National and
he was engaged in an independent business which was not
the insurance business or National's business. Hence his
business is taxable by the city, and by reason of the last sentence of the ordinance it does not purport to tax other than
that business, and the Hughes case is distinguishable. In
effect, they are asserting that the evidence does not support
the trial court's findings that plaintiff was engaged in no
business other than that of insurance and that he was National's agent.
[2a] At the outset, we have the statutory provision that an
insurer cannot conduct a bail bond business except by and
through a licensed bail agent (Ins. Code, § 1800, supra).
[3] Even the holding of an agent's license, which must have
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the approval of the insurer, is evidence of agency (ThompsonCadillac Co. v. United States Casualty Go., 180 Wash. 481
[40 P.2d 170]; Stoner v. First American Fire Ins. Go., 218
Iowa 720 [2:53 N.W. 821] ; 111acDonald v. JJJ.ilwa1.tkee Mechanics'
Ins. Go., 167 F.2d 276). [2b] It will not be assumed that
National is violating § 1800 of the Insurance Code, supra.
On the contrary, the presumption is that it obeyed the law
(Code Civ. Proc., §1963 ( 1), ( 33) ) , and therefore is doing its
hail bond business through plaintiff as its agent.
In
addition it appears that National gave broad powers to Assoeiated as its agent, expressly authorizing Associated to
appoint bail agents for National and to execute bail bonds.
Associated was, in effect, substantially the same as an officer
of National. Associated exercised close and direct supervision
over the agents appointed by it including plaintiff and limited
the maximum per cent the agents could charge for the bonds.
The agents filed weekly complete reports of business transacted with Associated and the latter in turn with National.
[4] In support of their claim of independent business, and
that plaintiff is not an agent, defendants point to the requirement of the Insurance Code that bail bond agents must
meet special qualifications and obtain a license to act as
such; that the contracts between National and Associated
refer to the "sale" of the bonds by the former to the latter
for "resale" to bail agents and similarly those between Associated and the agents refer to ''sale'' by Associated to the
agent for "resale" by him to the public; that plaintiff-agent
must indemnify Associated rather than National for losses
on bonds, and Associated indemnifies National; and that plaintiff maintains his own offices, pays his expenses, controls his
affairs and fixes the amount he charges as fees for arranging
for bonds. While those things may be factors to consider
Garrison v. State of California, 64 Cal.App.2d 820 [149
P.2d 711]), they are not so compelling as to refute wholly
the basic circumstances that National may only conduct a
hail bond business throug·h agents and hence it must be doing
so here; Associated is empowered by National to appoint
and does appoint agents such as plaintiff through vvhom National conducts its bail bond bnsine;;s; ~".ssociated is National's
instrumrntality or agent to appoint agents, and, as such,
t•xervis(eS dose supervision over- them: the amount r~harged for
a bond is limited by Assoeiated to a maximum of 10 per eent.
'l'he use of the terminolo~;y of "sale" with reference to
tho bonds as between National, Associated, and the agents,
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is of little assistance to defendants, because calling it a "sale"
by the agent of something (a bond) purchased by him, is not
realistic in view of the other circumstances. There is really
no sale as there is no pretense that the title to a bond passes
to Associated, then to the agent and finally to a member of
the public. Indeed the testimony shows that a mere recordkeeping device was in the minds of the parties. One of the
partners of Associated testified :
'' Q. BY MR. FLYNN: Now, am I correct in understanding
your statement, Mr. Groves, that the premium, so far as the
copy is concerned, is one per cent~ A. That is the amount
that is put in here, and the amount that is-'' THE CoURT : That is paid to the company¥
''THE WITNESS: No. It is quite something to explain. That
is the way it was devised at the time these forms were prepared. There was a question, so your Honor will really get
what the full picture is-there was a question as to whether
or not if the company would have to pay on the gross amount
that the agent received as a tax, which necessitated then each
agent filing a complete list of each and every bond written,
the total amount he received. If they were outside of the
State of California, he had to deduct them, and so forth. It
made quite a thing, and so then it was devised that this receipt which would show one per cent here is the amount the
insurance company or surety company would presumably pay
the state tax on, and the balance was to presumably go to
the agent and to us, and then we pay the company.'' (Rep.
Tr., p. 106.)
[5] Defendants rely upon various provisions of the Insurance Code, asserting that a broker dealing in ordinary
insurance is an agent of the insured and not the insurer, and
rebates on premiums may not be given or commissions split by
them except where he is placing the insurance with sureties
which have not appointed them as agents, citing Ins. Code,
§§ 750. 755, 755.5, which are not applicable to bail insurance
'' . . . except that in such case the licensee who executes the
nndertaking or executes or delivers the bail bond shall, in
all matter-s in r-espect thereto, be deemed the principal and
all licensees otherwise connected with the transaction shall
be deemed his agents in respect thereto." (Ins. Code, § 1809.)
(Emphasis added.) They reason that therefore the bail agent
is an independent contractor like an insurance broker. Accepting their premise it is plain from§ 1809, supra, like § 1800,
supr-a, that in all matters in respect thereto (even if commis-
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siom; are split or rebates given) the snrety on the bail bond is
the principal and all licrnsees connected ·with the transaction
are the ~mrety 's agent. [6] 'l'he fact that bail ag·ents are
subject to regulation and mm;t meet certain qualifications does
not deprive them of the character of agents for the insurer.
'rrue, the insurer may not deprive an agent of his state license,
but it can discharge him as its agent, and before he can cmJtimw to do bm;iness as a bail agent, he must find another
insurer for 1vhom br may aet a::; an agent and the insuranel'
commissioner must be notified thereof.
One of the main contentions of defendants is that the
money reeeived by plaintiff-agent other than the 1 per eent
paid to National is not premium for the bond; that the ordinance purports to reach only such receipts of the agent because it excludes from the tax on his gross receipts any insurance premiums received by him on behalf of an insurance
company, and, therefore, it does not violate the constitutional
provision as the latter reserves to the state the right to tax
gross premiums of insurance companies; that lacking the
eharacteristies of premiums, plaintiff's business in receiving
them is independent and not as agent of National.
It is urged that the foregoing question is not involved
in this ease because it does not eoncern whether the state may
tax those receipts, and that the sole issue is whether plaintiff
was National's agent and within the holding of H1tghes v.
City of Los Angeles, supra, 168 Cal. 764, and thus subject to
the ordinance. \Ve believe, however, that the question is so
intimately eonnected with the problem presented that it must
be determined. While it is true that no insurance company
is a party to this proceeding and there are actions pending in
the superior court for Los Angeles County by the state against
insuranee companies to recover gross premium taxes which
involve sueh reeeipts, the state Insuranee Commissioner and
several insurance companies, including National, have filed
briefs in this case and diseuss the q nestion. The judgment
rendered by thr trial eourt in this case is broad. It deelares
that plaintiff is not subject to the tax provided for under the
ordinance and enjoins defendants from eollecting any such
tax from plaintiff. Moreover, it is clear that the nature of
plaintiff's receipts has some bearing upon whether, in condueting the business by which he receives them, he is doing
an insurance business for National.
[7] Defendants point out (heretofore mentioned) that
the receipt given by the plaintiff-agent to the one obtaining the
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bail bond, mentions only the 1 per cent received by National as
the premium, and the rest is for services in arranging for the
bond. Also he bears the burden of his expenses in conducting
the business and may charge for the bond such percentage as
he desires not exceeding 10 per cent. We hold, however, that
that does not necessarily establish him as an independent contractor rather than National's agent. [8] We believe also
that there is no escape from the conclusion that the full sum
received by him from the one desiring the bail bond is the
gross premium for the bond. National may act only through
agents and plaintiff is its agent. All the business transacted
by plaintiff is agency business, the end objective and result of
which is to find takers of bail bonds and to furnish bail bonds
to applicants therefor, and the amount charged the applicant
for a bond is the premium on that bond. It is not significant
how National, Associated and plaintiff choose to allocate that
amount, such as for various services, premiums, etc. That is
nothing more than an intramural arrangement for their convenience. The fact remains that whatever plaintiff receives
from the customer or client for a bond, he is authorized to
obtain it, and does so as agent of National. The question
should not turn on whether the amount charged for the bond is
broken down to specific items for their convenience. The
situation should be the same as where National paid plaintiff's
expenses incurred in writing bonds, because those expenses
would be reflected in the gross premium paid-the amount
charged the applicant for a bond. Nor is it persuasive
that plaintiff-agent does not pay all of the 10 per cent he
receives to Associated or National. There is little difference
whether he uses it to defray the expenses of conducting the
bail bond business and pay himself a commission or whether
all of it is paid to National which in turn pays him a commission and meets the expenses.
The essence of the
matter is that the amount paid by the insured for the bond
is the premium and it has been so recognized by the courts.
(See Bankers Life Co. v. Richardson, 192 Cal. 113 [218 P.
586]; Western T. Ace. Assn. v. Johnson, 14 Cal.App.2d 306
[58 P.2d 206]; Mutual Benefit L. Ins. Co. v. Richardson,
192 Cal. 369 [219 P. 1003] ; Industrial Indem. Exch. v. State
Board of Equalization, 26 Cal.2d 772 [161 P.2d 222] ; State
Farm etc. Ins. Co. v. Carpente1·, 31 Cal.App.2d 178 [87 P.2d
867] . ) And a mere bookkeeping method cannot thwart the
law. (Industrial Indem. Exch. v. State Board of Equalization,
supra, 26 Cal.2d 772.) Defendants seem to think that State
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Ji1a,rm Etc. Ins. Go: v. Gar·penter, supra, 31 Cal..App.2d 178,
holding that a membership fee to become a member of an
insurance organization is not a part of the premium, and
Mntual Benefit L. Ins. Co. v. Richarclson., supra, 192 Cal.
369. holding· that the amount of the premium stated in the
poliey above the cost thereof and declared as a dividend to
the insured, was not premium, are opposed to the views here
expressed, bnt those holdings on the facts are not contrary to
the prineiple here stated, because the snms paid were not
what was actually g'iven by the insured for his insurance.
ln the first case above cited the membership fee did not entitle
the payor to insurance. It only authorized him to apply for
insurance and pay the premium. In the second, the amount
[>aid back to the insured as a dividend meant the premium
was that much less. In both the basic theory is that the
amount paid by the insured for the insurance is the premium.
Here, as the bail agent is the insurer's agent, what he
receives from the applicant for the insurance-that is, what the
applicant pays for the bail bond is the premium. \Vhat the
agent receives, in legal effect the insurer receives. The socalled "fees" received by the bail agent do not result in a
r·eduction of the cost to the insured.
[9] In varions aspects the contention is made that administrative construction requires the conclusion that the 9
per cent retained by the agent is not premium. It is pointed
orrt that the state has collected a tax on only the 1 per cent
received by National. That is all its books would show, and a
ll eglect to coilect the tax because of failure to look beyond
those books is hardly a comrwlling construction that the 1 per
cent was the only premium. [10] Moreover, it must be remembered, concerning this question of administrative constnwtion, that where it is erroneous it is not binding on the
(~on rt. ( Californirr Drive-In Restaurant Assn. v. Clark, 22
Ca1.2d 287 [140 P.2cl 657, 147 A.L.R. 1028] ; Bodinson Mfg.
Go. v. Cali.foTnia Emp. Com., 17 Cal.2d 321 [109 P.2d 9~5] .)
It is urged that if the bail bond is cancelled the insurer
(National) is liable for a return of only 1 per cent stated
as premium on the fare of the bond (citing l nsurance Code,
§§ 480-48~1 a!H'I hPncr the 1 per cent is the only premium.
'!'hose sections deal, howevee, with the requirement that premiums be returned, whatever they be rather t1Jan what constitutes preminms. and are thns of no assistance. Moreover,
the general agent, and plaintiff testified that the whole amount
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received from the applicant for the bond. was returned upon
cancellation, indicating that such amount was the premium.
Point is made of the requirement that every policy
must set forth therein the premium (Ins. Code, § 381(f)) and
the commissioner's rules require separation of "premium"
and fees in the bail agent's record. This, it is claimed, shows
the fees ( 9 per cent) were not part of the premium and the
state so recognized it. That is not significant because there
may be other reasons why the agent should not make a "breakdown'' of the charge to a bail bond applicant for a bond, but,
as seen, the full amount paid is the gross premium which is
known by the bail bond applicant.
'rhe judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. ,J., Shenk, ,J., Edmond:-;, ,J., and Traynor, ,l.,
eoncurred.
SCHAUER, ,J.-I dissent. Under the majority opmwn
herein, as under the opinion in Hughes v. Los Angeles (1914),
168 Cal. 764, 765 [145 P. 94], there are classes of businessthose of local insurance agent and of bail bondsman-in
which persons may engage without being subject to local
license taxation. The express ground of decision of the
Hughes case is that "in a direct and immediate sense a tax
upon Rnch agents [general and local insurance agents] for the
right to do business is a tax upon the corporation's right to do
businPss" ( p. 765 of 168 Cal.). But the theory of the Hughes
easE' and this case cannot be logically limited to freeing local
agents from local license taxes. The provision of the California
Constitution (art. XIII, § 14 4/5) which imposes the state
"in lieu" tax upon insurance companies does so "in lieu of
all other taxes and licenses, state, county, and municipal, upon
such insurers and their property, except [ (1) taxes on their
rea] estate; (2) taxes with respect to a trust department
operated by a title immrer; (3) as to foreig·n insurers doing
bnsines,; in this state, reciprocal taxes in accord with those imposed by the foreign state on California insurers doing business there; ( 4) the tax on ocean marine insurance].'' (Italics
added.)
If the Hughes ease is to be given consistent application then
a state tax upon an insurance agent's income derived from
his insurance business is as invalid as a local license tax on
the right to carry on such business. In Edward Brown & Sons
v. McColgan (1942), 53 Cal.App.2d 504, 506-508 [128 P.2d
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186 J, the Distric~t Court of Appeal was confronted with such
a problem. There a corporate insurance agent contended that
because of the Hughes decision it need not pay its franchise
(state income) tax. This contention was rejected. The appellate
court attempted to distinguish the Hughes case on the ground
that the Hughes license tax was upon the privilege of transacting; insurance business and impinged directly on the insuralll'f' eompany, whereas the franchise tax was upon the
(•.orporate agent's privilege of being a eorporation.
'l'he majority opinion in the present case recognizes the
dii'ficulty of drawing snch a distinction and says (p. 756,
supra), ''the soundness of the last cited case may be questionable." But, the majority opinion goes on to say, "it may be
distinguished on the ground that, although the franchise tax
is eomputed on the net income of the corporation, it is on
the privilege of using the corporate mechanism to do business
and hence has no relation to the nature of the business conducted. Thus the tax is not on the insurance business within
the meaning of the Constitution.'' The purported distinction
made by the majority would have no application to a state
income tax on an individual insurance agent.
I would, therefore, conclude that the Hughes decision is
unsound and should be overruled. It is my further opinion
that, even without overruling that case, the validity of Los
Angeles Ordinance No. 77,000, as amended by Ordinance No.
92,414, could be upheld. If this latter conclusion were reached
then, as will hereinafter appear, Groves would not be subject
to the license tax because nf the terms of the ordinance itself,
rather than beeause of a strained application of section 14 4/5
of article XU [ of the state Constitution. The ordinance provides that '' 1'he term 'gross receipts' as used herein shall not
include any insurance premiums received on behalf of any in:mrance company qualified to do business in the State of California, nor any eommissions paid out of sueh premiums."
'rhis provision appears to be designed to avoid any litigation
sueh as that in the Hughes (1914) and Edward Brown
(1942) cases, supra, by expressly excluding from the "gross
receipts" which are the measure of the tax the entire amount
eollected by a bail bondsman as payment for a bail bond. It
thus appears that while Los Angeles could have taxed the
amount received b_v the bail bondsman as payment for his
services (rather than as premium to the insurance company)
it did not choose to do so.
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'!'he jwlg-men1 of ll!P trial eourt does not recognize that
it is bPeamw of Hw tPnns of tlw ordinane•~ itself that certain
1axes ea u tJOt. he i mposPd on Groves; rather, it perpetually en-

joills defendaJJt:-> from eolleeting any taxes from Groves under
such ordinance. Since Groves may become liable for taxes
other than those here discussed, I would reverse the judgment.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied May 21,
1953. Schauer, J., and Spence, .T., were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.

[L. A. No. 22379.

In Bank.

Apr. 28, 1953.]

Cl'l'Y (H' IDS A'\.NGELES, Respondent, v. RANCHO
HOMES, INC., Appellant.
[la, lb] Licenses-Construction of License Laws.-Although such
terms as "trade, calling, occupation, vocation, profession or
other means of livelihood" and "as an independent contractor,"
as used in a license tax ordinance, commonly embrace persons
engaged in rendering personal services, they are not limited to
that activity.
[2] !d.-Construction of License Laws.-Activities of a corporation organized for the purpose of "acquiring, subdividing, improving, selling and otherwise dealing in and disposing of real
property," are more than simply those of a landowner who sells
his realty, and such a course of conduct reasonably may be denominated a "trade" or "occupation" within the purview of
a license tax ordinance.
[3] Independent Contractors-Definitions.-The term "independent
contractor" may assume a variety of meanings according to
the intent with which it is used in particular legislation; it is
not necessarily restricted to one who performs personal services.
[ 4] Licenses-Construction of License Laws.-Provision of license
tax ordinance that every person engaged in "any trade, calling,
occupation, vocation, profession or other means of livelihood
. . . not specifically licensed by other provisions of this
article . . . shall pay a license fee" on "gross receipts" may
not be construed as intended to be a limitation on the types of
business for which a license is required to be obtained.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Licenses, § 5; Am.Jur., Licenses, § 4.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4-7, 9] Licenses, § 16; [3] Independent Contractors, § 1; [8] Statutes, § 180(2); [10] Licenses,
§ 12.

